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Abstract 
 
This paper seeks to establish the extent of displacement effects across gaming products. 
This is a particularly difficult question to address with precision. To date, many studies 
have looked at policy changes such as the introduction of a new product into the market 
to assess the severity of displacement effects. However, simple before and after 
comparisons are invalid. One n eds to know what the appropriate counterfactual would 
have been in the absence of the policy change - which by its very nature is 
unobservable. The alternative is to look at identical populations exposed to different 
regimes.  Australia represents such a natural experiment. In Australia, Betting and 
Gaming legislation is determined at the state level, giving rise to some interesting 
differentials across states within a single country. This paper estimates a state level 
(fixed effects) panel data model, exploiting the intra-state differences in the portfolio of 
gaming products available, to estimate the extent of displacement effects across the 
gaming sector. The results are particularly relevant to the current UK policy debate 
which is focused on the potential impact on the existing market following a 
forthcoming, radical deregulation of the industry (with further liberalisation proposed). 
Key Words: Gambling; Panel Data; Fixed Effects.  
JEL Classification: L83 
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 2
MEASURING DISPLACEMENT EFFECTS ACROSS GAMING PRODUCTS: A 
STUDY OF AUSTRALIAN GAMBLING MARKETS 
 
 
I. Introduction. 
 
The market place for gaming products is an innovative environment. Increasing 
knowledge of players’ tastes and changing technology has lead to increasing product 
diversity and many jurisdictions across the world have permitted or are considering 
legalising casinos and high prize machine gaming for the first time. This paper will 
examine the impact of these new forms of gaming on one particular product in the 
gambling sector, namely lotto. That is, we seek to establish the extent of displacement 
effects on lotto games from new entrants into the gaming market, utilising data from a 
panel of Australian states. Lotto is our focus because in many jurisdictions it has a 
special status in that it funds important causes, for example student scholarships in 
Florida and sports and arts provision in the United Kingdom.   
 
To date, a number of studies have looked at policy changes, such as the introduction of 
a new product into the market, to assess the severity of displacement effects on existing 
gaming products. However, simple before and after comparisons are invalid. One needs 
to know what the appropriate counterfactual would have been in the absence of the 
policy change - which by its very nature is unobservable. The alternative is to look at 
identical populations exposed to different regimes.  Australia represents such a natural 
experiment. In Australia, betting and gaming legislation is determined at the state level 
giving rise to some interesting differentials across states within a single country.  
 
Australia provides an ideal setting within which to investigate issues relating to 
displacement effects given the range of different products introduced at different times 
by different state governments. It is clear that multiculturalism and diversity exists 
within Australia which makes direct policy prescriptions difficult; but this does not 
necessarily imply that countries cannot learn from each others’ experiences - 
commonalities also exist which can be exploited in order to draw sensible policy 
recommendations. In many respects Australia is the perfect ‘laboratory’ for work on this 
topic - the complexity of gaming regulation, variation in the social acceptance of 
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 3
gambling and socio-economic diversity across Australia create the necessary ‘ripples’ 
that are important for this kind of analysis. In addition, Australia has a richness of data 
regarding betting and gaming revenue to surpass most other countries.  
 
The Australian case is particularly relevant to the ongoing debate on the reform of 
gambling law in Britain, in particular to controversy over the extent to which modern 
casino style gaming should be permitted. Until now, Britain’s casinos have borne little 
similarity to the international model. They are members’ clubs focussed on table games 
with only ten gaming machines permitted and with these limited to offering a maximum 
prize of only £2,000. Following the liberal recommendations in the Budd Report 
(DCMS, 2001), the Government introduced an only slightly less radical Gambling Bill 
into Parliament in 2003. This proposed that unlimited prize electronic gaming machines 
(EGMs) would be permitted in a new generation of ‘regional’, ‘large’ and ‘small’ 
casinos. ‘Regional’ casinos would have no limit on the number of devices and could 
offer multiple styles of gambling such as bingo and betting; ‘large’ casinos, defined by a 
minimum square footage designed to encourage their location in town centres rather 
than residential neighbourhoods, would also have no restraints on the number of 
machines; ‘small’ casinos were defined by a minimum space requirement and the 
number of machines was limited by a maximum ratio of machines to table games on 
offer. At this stage no limit on the number of new casinos was envisioned: the market 
would decide. Commentators expected several regional resort-style casinos to be built, 
with a network of perhaps 200 ‘large’ venues providing more local facilities. 
 
In the event, fierce opposition from lobbyists acting on behalf of existing gaming 
interests and anti-gambling organisations forced a substantial dilution of the proposals 
by the time the Bill became an Act in April, 2005. Only seventeen new casino licences 
are now authorised to be issued, one for a regional casino and eight each in the large and 
small categories. Further, only the single regional casino will be permitted to offer the 
largest pay-out (Category A) machines. This is unlikely to be the final outcome, 
however, since a future review of the law is proposed in light of experience of the new 
style casinos. Debate on the merits of providing destination resort casinos and EGMs in 
casinos serving more local markets is therefore ongoing in Britain. 
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Australia offers an equivalent to ‘regional’ casinos in thirteen casinos spread across the 
country. Further, most states permit casino-style EGMs in designated areas of ‘hotels’ 
(pubs and bars) and clubs and these often provide 100-200 machines. Such venues are 
roughly equivalent to the ‘large’ casinos in the British legislation. Crucially for our 
purpose, separate data are available for turnover, player losses, etc in these two sectors, 
labelled ‘casinos and ‘EGMs’ in the data set available to us. Australia therefore offers 
the possibility of analysing the impact of both super-casinos (access to which will 
necessarily involve significant travel for most of the population) and a network of more 
local machine gaming venues. The close relevance of the Australian experience to 
proposals for Britain has been recognised in the debate on the link between machine 
gaming and problem gambling (Dodgson, Maunders and Chesters, 2004) but here we 
exploit it to inform the question of whether either super-casinos or a network of local 
EGM venues draw expenditure from state on-line lotteries.    
 
The question is of some general interest. It is clear that in a world of budget constraints 
the introduction of a new product will necessarily lead to resources being diverted from 
the purchase of other products. Thus, as the portfolio of gambling products expands, it 
is interesting to ask whether the displacement comes from within the gambling sector or 
from elsewhere. The cannibalisation of existing products by new forms of gambling 
would limit the extent to which product innovation would lead to growth of gambling in 
total. The alternative is that product innovation here shifts resources from other sectors 
of the economy. So it may be the case that the observed product innovation is a result of 
players quickly becoming bored of games and needing constant stimulation in order that 
the sector can retain its revenue positions; or such innovations may be leading to actual 
growth of total gambling activity through external displacement effects.  
 
2. Background and literature review. 
 
In order to place the empirical analysis in context we will begin by providing a brief 
outline of the gaming sector in Australia. For a full review of gambling in Australia, see 
the comprehensive report by the Australian Productivity Commission (1999). We will 
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 5
then proceed to review the existing literature on displacement effects within betting and 
gaming markets.  
 
2.1 The Australian gaming sector. 
 
Australians lost AU$14b (about AU$1,000 per person) in gambling activities in 2000 
(Blanks, 2002) accounting for more than 1.5% of GDP. Annually 80% of Australians 
participate in gambling products and allocate 3.5% of their household disposable 
income to these activities. Lotteries have been in operation since the early 1900’s and 
are the most popular gambling activity, with 60% of the adult population playing. 
Bookmaking was legalised in the 1940s when the Totalisator Agency Boards were 
established in most states and these are now being privatized.  The 1970s and 1980s saw 
the introduction of new lottery games and the opening of Australia’s first ‘casinos’1. 
There are now 13 casinos in Australia. In several states, the 1990s saw the legalisation 
of ‘poker machines’ (EGMs); prior to this they had been available only in New South 
Wales (NSW).  
 
Lotteries have a long history in Australia with the first non-profit lottery being run in 
Queensland in 1916 to raise revenue for war programmes. The success of such lotteries 
resulted in the state taking over their operation and other states introducing their own 
lotteries. By the 1930s lotteries and minor gaming such as charity raffles and bingo 
were legalised throughout Australia. There are many types of lotteries but Lotto has 
been the market leader in recent years. Lotto is also the most popular lottery game 
played around the world. Players must select a set of numbers from a choice of a larger 
set (without replacement) with the winning numbers being drawn randomly by the 
lottery operators. For example, in the basic 6/49 game, players pick six numbers from 
49. It is important that these two parameters are selected carefully as they determine the 
probability of winning and this should be set at a level proportionate to the population 
size. Hence games vary across Australian states in accordance with population 
differences. Both government and commercial operators run Lotto games. Lotto, and 
                                                 
1 In many jurisdictions, the term ‘casino’ is used to describe any location the main function of which is 
the provision of machine or table gaming. However, in Australia it is reserved for large Las Vegas- style 
venues and not used when referring to even large machine gaming rooms in hotels and clubs. 
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 6
similar games such as Powerball, are operated both at the state level and in terms of 
multi-state games. Oz-lotto (drawn every Tuesday) is the national game and Saturday 
night lotto is operated by the Australia Lotto Bloc which includes all states (though 
New South Wales joined only in 2000, having previously provided a state specific game 
on Saturdays). Instant lotteries (or scratch cards) are also available. These are cards 
which players purchase and then scratch off panels to reveal whether or not they have 
won. They are usually priced from AU$1-10. The prizes tend to be relatively small but 
the probability of winning is typically better than that of other lottery products. 
Scratchcard data are available separately from sales figures for lotto and other on-line 
games. 
 
‘Poker machines’ or EGMs have a long tradition in NSW (they were introduced to clubs 
in the 1930s) but were a more recent introduction to other states in the 1990s. 
Approximately 20% of the world’s EGMs are located in Australia. There are currently 
around 185,000 in operation and half of these are located in NSW. They can be found in 
clubs and hotels2 and the venues that house them generate substantial revenue from the 
machines. There is a large amount of policy debate in Australian regarding the issue of 
gaming machines. The rapid growth of this sector of the industry has caused some 
concern. The machines in each club and sometimes across clubs are linked to a central 
jackpot. Studies of gaming machine players in Victorian Casinos show that 
expenditures increase as the jackpot reaches its upper limit.  These venues typically also 
offer the facilities to play keno (which is also available in casinos). In keno the odds of 
winning and the prizes vary according to how many numbers are chosen and matched.  
 
Casinos have been a more recent introduction to the gaming sector with growth 
throughout the 1970’s and 1980’s- Tasmania and the Northern Territory were the first to 
legalise them and there is now at least one in each state (but only 13 in total exist across 
the country). Casinos offer a range of games, some dependent on luck and some with 
varying degrees of skill associated with the outcome. Payouts vary by game and are 
highly regulated. Due to the relatively small number of casinos in operation their 
                                                 
2 In Australia bars and pubs are referred to as hotels and clubs are community based non-profit 
organisations.    
Page 6 of 23
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
 
 7
introduction has attracted less debate relative to the rapid proliferation of EGMs in 
smaller local venues. 
 
2.2 Literature Review 
 
There have been a number of attempts to assess cannibalisation within the gambling 
sector (for a review, see Paton, Siegel and Vaughan Williams, 2003). Here we focus on 
studies that include examination of the impact of casino gaming on lotteries. Evidence 
is predominantly American. Anderson and Navan (1996) reported a negative 
relationship between state lottery revenue and riverboat gambling in six states. Anders 
and Siegel (1998) and Siegel and Anders (2001) focused on the impact of Indian 
gaming on lottery revenue in Arizona. They estimate that a 10% increase in the number 
of slot machines3 in casinos located on reservations is associated with a 3.7% decline in 
lotto sales and thus partially accept the operator’s argument that declining lottery sales 
can be blamed on the spread of Indian gaming. However, they caution that such a 
finding may not be generalisable across states, noting for example that Steinnes (1998) 
had found smaller impacts for Minnesota.  
 
Recent contributions have attempted to gain more general insight by applying fixed 
effects analysis to annual data from panels of states. Elliott and Navan (2002) and Fink 
and Rork (2003) found strong displacement effects on lottery revenue from riverboat 
and commercial (i.e. non Tribal) casino sectors respectively. For example, Fink and 
Rork estimated that if casino games take an extra $5 from consumers, lottery turnover 
declines by $1.60. By contrast, Walker (2000) reported that in a lottery demand 
equation, casino revenue attracted a significant positive coefficient, implying that 
increases in casino gaming actually raise lottery sales, a contrast with other research 
findings in the US and possibly explained by a failure to account for endogeneity issues. 
 
 From the perspective of potential to inform policy formation in other countries, we are 
sceptical over the usefulness of the findings from studies such as these since they 
average out impacts over states with very different styles of casino in very different 
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 8
locations. For example, in addition to Indian gaming, the rapid expansion of the US 
casino sector from the 1990s (documented in Eadington (1999)) took the form of 
openings of riverboats, racinos (at racetracks), destination resort casinos (such as at 
Biloxi), and facilities both in large cities (e.g. Detroit) and in depressed towns relatively 
remote from major population centres (e.g. former mining communities in Colorado). 
Thus, across states, there is great variety in the style of casino gaming offered. Different 
patterns of provision may have different effects which are masked by an overall 
average. For example, if casinos are in remote locations, visits by most individuals may 
be infrequent and, to the extent these visits boost the desire to gamble, other gambling 
media will benefit between times; but if casinos are very accessible, their net effect may 
be to draw funds that would otherwise be allocated to other accessible gambling 
opportunities like lottery tickets. Policy makers require to know what effects will follow 
from licencing specific types of casino. Knowledge of the relationship between an 
‘average’ system of casinos and other modes of gambling is less valuable. In this 
respect, a panel data study for Australia has more potential than one for America 
because the data distinguish expenditure in regional super-casinos (which have 
territorial monopolies for their style of product offering) and expenditure in machines 
located in the community in venues comparable with what the British legislation terms 
‘large’ casinos. 
 
In this paper we will look in the Australian data for evidence of any displacement of 
lotto spending by EGMs. We control for displacement from other (non-gambling) 
leisure and entertainment activities4.  
 
 
3. Data  
 
Data on gaming were provided by the Tasmanian Gaming Commission (2003), which, 
by agreement between the states, was (until recently) responsible for maintaining and 
                                                                                                                                               
3 Tribes are not obliged to file turnover and other financial data and the number of slots therefore had to 
serve as a proxy for dollar expenditure on slots. 
4 For Missouri, Siegel and Anders (1999), using county-level data, found that expansion of riverboat 
gaming was associated with decline in consumer expenditure on other forms of entertainment. 
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 9
updating state level gambling data for Australia. We use 20 years of data (financial year 
1982/83-2001/02) from the eight Australian states and territories. Other variables have 
been added to the model from the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) Time Series 
Statistics Plus dataset. This contains data from approximately 20,000 published and 
unpublished series from over fifty ABS Main Economic Indicators and related 
publications. The data have been changed from nominal to real values using the 
Consumer Price Index ( with 1976 as base year) and all variables have been converted 
to per capita values to account for population differences across states. 
 
An important aspect for identification of displacement effects in our statistical 
modelling is the fact that there has been variation across states and through time in the 
types of gaming activities offered and hence Table 1 shows the dates at which the 
different products have been introduced to the gaming market (although a complete set 
of dates for all forms of gaming in all states is not available). Whilst the date for the 
introduction of lotto is unknown in a number of states, it was in operation for the 
duration of the data used in this exercise (hence we have a balanced panel). 
Interestingly, in Western Australia (WA) we can see that EGMs are illegal but casinos 
are not. That is, poker machines are allowed in very large, but not in smaller, facilities. 
The fact that EGMs have always been illegal outside ‘casinos’ (i.e. hotels and clubs do 
not offer machine gaming) in WA makes it an interesting ‘control’ state for this 
analysis. 
 
The variable to be modelled is lotto turnover and Figure 1 shows the real per capita lotto 
turnover by state for the period considered in our data. Simply eyeballing the data, we 
can see that lotto sales in WA (the only state where EGMs are illegal) have seen the 
greatest growth over the period. NSW, which has the greatest number of EGMs, has 
seen stable lotto turnover; however gaming machines were introduced there long before 
our data begin. Victoria seems to have seen a fall in lotto turnover in the 1990s 
corresponding to the introduction of EGMs, but the opposite is true for the Northern 
Territory. However, it is difficult to extract information from this kind of univariate 
analysis and hence the next section will discuss the multivariate framework that will be 
employed to investigate potential displacement effects.  
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 10
4. Statistical framework 
 
Our data consist of yearly time series for each state and therefore represent a simple 
panel dataset. We want to consider the impact on lotto turnover of alternative forms of 
gaming and hence lotto turnover is our dependent variable. Since lotto has existed in all 
states for the time period under consideration, the panel is balanced. It is highly likely 
that there are important state characteristics to which lotto turnover is related. Indeed, 
turnover from the gambling industry varies immensely by state, suggesting important 
differences in either the social acceptability of gambling or the level of state regulation 
and control (which in a democracy ought to reflect the tastes of the majority of the 
population, albeit with the possibility of time lags) or some combination of these 
influences. To allow for these effects we will estimate a fixed effect model. 
 
ititititit vXGSlottoT ++++= 3210 ββββ       (1) 
 
where itlotto  is lotto turnover in state i at time t, itS  is a set of seven state dummy 
variables (Northern Territory is the reference state), itG is a set of dummy variables for 
the different forms of gaming available in each state through time and itX  is a set of 
time varying state characteristics.  
 
Given that our interest is in the displacement effect on lotto from the introduction of 
alternative forms of gaming, itG  consists of:  other lotteries, instants, casinos, minor 
gaming (e.g. bingo), keno (a machine game with a structure similar to that of lotto) and 
EGMs. itX  consists of a mixture of variables. Unemployment is included (to try to 
capture aspects of the business cycle that might impact on lottery play) along with a 
time trend. Expenditure on tobacco and alcohol is added as a proxy for the prevalence of 
permissive attitudes in a state (Forrest and Gulley, 2006 show for UK households that 
there is strong positive correlation between expenditure on alcohol, tobacco and each of 
six types of gambling including lotto). Finally, spending in cafes/restaurants and hotels 
is included to capture potential displacement effects from the broader leisure and 
entertainment sector, as suggested by previous literature. It is not possible  explicitly to 
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 11
include expenditure on ‘recreation and culture’ in the model as the Australian National 
Accounts include gambling expenditure itself in this category and therefore it would be 
endogenous within our model. Including ‘cafes/restaurants and hotels’ is one solution. 
Potentially, however, it also is not without problems. EGMs are found in many 
(although not all) hotels and so there may be a high degree of correlation between 
expenditure in this category and expenditure on EGMs even though the figure for cafes/ 
restaurants and hotels excludes EGM revenue (the cafes/ restaurants and hotels category 
picks up mainly food and snack expenditure). A quick look at the correlation coefficient 
between these two groups shows, however, that there appears not to be a problem (the 
correlation is 0.0335) and so both categories of expenditure were included in the model.  
 
The inclusion of dummy variables to capture the impact of the introduction of new 
gaming opportunities is rather crude in that it does not allow for the fact that the long 
run effect maybe different from the initial impact. It is, however, possible to measure 
the displacement effects more precisely given that we know the turnover from 
alternative gaming activities. Therefore the above model is rerun where itG  now 
represents the turnover from each form of gambling. This allows us to measure the 
average displacement effects over time. However, this specification raises a potential 
endogeneity problem. Turnover for each of the alternative gaming opportunities is 
potentially endogenous. 
 
Given that consumers simultaneously decide how to allocate their expenditure across 
gaming activities, turnover of keno, say, is likely to be endogenous to lotto turnover, 
that is 0),cov( ≠itit vG . However, we do have a potential instrument for turnover in each 
of the alternative gaming activities and this is the corresponding expenditure. Note that 
turnover is the amount bet regardless of the amount returned as winnings. For example, 
in the case of EGMs, turnover is the total amount paid into the machines, unadjusted for 
the amount that is returned as winnings. Expenditure, however, is the amount spent after 
winnings have been accounted for.  
 
Turnover and expenditure differ in the gambling industry due to player losses but they 
are obviously highly correlated, which satisfies one criterion for a good instrument. 
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However it would be inappropriate to use expenditure as an instrument for turnover 
unless price (take-out) were exogenous. For most gambling media this is the case as the 
take-out rate it is set by a regulator or by legislation and is also a function of the tax 
imposed on the gaming activity. In the case of Australia, the taxation of gambling is a 
combination of federal and states taxes, adding interesting exogenous variation in 
expenditure relative to turnover across states. The average national gambling taxation in 
1999-00 was AU$275 per capita. However, it was much higher in Victoria with a per 
capita tax of AU$385.  Gambling taxes in 1999-00 were AU$4.4 billion, 2.2% of total 
taxation. Table 2 shows the breakdown of EGM prices and taxes by state as an example 
of the variation that is observed. For full tables revealing the full taxation differentials 
by gaming product across states, see Chapter 13, Productivity Commission (1999). It is 
clear that expenditure therefore differs from turnover due to exogenous variation in 
regulation and taxation and is therefore a suitable instrument for turnover.   
 
 
It should also be noted that using a two-tail Pearson Correlation test, correlation was 
found between EGM expenditure and EGMs turnover at the 1% level of significance 
and no correlation was found between EGM expenditure and the error term in equation 
(1). This is also true for all the other gaming expenditure variables. We are, therefore, as 
content as one may be that they are suitable instruments for turnover. The final model is 
therefore estimated by two stage least squares (2SLS). 
 
5. Results 
The three specifications estimated are: first, a dummy variables specification that 
concentrates on the impact at the point of introduction of alternative gaming activities 
and assumes this to be constant from that point on; second, a specification that replaces 
the dummy variables with the respective level of turnover for the alternative forms of 
gaming; and finally, we perform an instrumental variable estimation, using expenditure 
to instrument turnover. The results are presented in Table3. The first thing to note is the 
relative performance of the three models. It is clear in terms of 2R  criteria that the 
dummy variables specification fits the data well; however, for reasons discussed below, 
we feel this model is misspecified. As we move from the turnover model to the final 
instrumental variables (IV) model, we see that the goodness of fit improves. The IV fits 
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 13
the data best and is our preferred specification both on theoretical and empirical 
grounds. It is nevertheless interesting to compare the three sets of estimates.  
 
The dummy variable estimates of the displacement effects report a very different story 
from the IV estimates. This is perhaps not too surprising as they are capturing different 
effects. The dummy variables are constructed to be zero until a gaming product is 
introduced and one thereafter. This assumes that the effect at the point of introduction is 
constant from that point forward in time. However this may not be the case. The initial 
impact in the first year say following the launch of a new gaming activity may be very 
different from the long term impact, say 10 years later. Removing the dummy variables 
and replacing them with the annual turnover for new gaming activities will capture 
these potential changes through time. The resultant estimate in this case tells us about 
the average displacement effects of new gaming activities.  
 
One can see that the displacement effects from lotteries and minor gaming lose 
significance in the IV model and this is perhaps explained by the fact that they are the 
most likely endogenous gaming activities. The impact of EGMs is not picked up in the 
dummy variable specification but is significant in the other models. This is not 
surprising as EGMs exist in multiple small venues and these will have taken time to 
develop - so the growth of EGMs and any resultant impact on lotto is likely to occur 
gradually. Instant scratch cards, produced by the state lottery organisations, are not 
significant in any of the models: instants appear to grow the lottery market rather than 
cannibalise the on-line games. The IV results suggest that, in the case of other forms of 
gaming, there are negative displacement effects on lotto from the introduction of keno 
(which is significant in all specifications) and EGMs - with the quantitative effects from 
keno (-0.286) being larger than that from EGMs (-0.016).  For ‘casinos’, however, the 
sign of the estimated coefficient is positive (+0.017) in the IV specification. This 
suggests, as in Walker’s (2000) US study, that growth in casino gaming reinforces 
growth in lotto sales. Such results are possible because a new product may cannibalise 
existing products (positive displacement) or promote them by spreading or deepening 
the taste for gambling as a generic activity (negative displacement). 
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 14
We find that turnover in Australian ‘casinos’ (which will include table and machine 
games) boosts rather than curtails sales of lotto and lotto-style products. Presumably this 
is because trips to these regional casinos advertise the idea of gambling to participants; 
but, for most people, access to a casino is not available on a weekly or daily basis, so 
that, after their trip, it is not an option to replace the regular purchase of lottery tickets 
with regular gaming in the casino. By contrast, increases in EGM turnover are shown by 
our results to be at the expense of lotto sales. Such cannibalisation is unsurprising. 
Putting money in machines or spending it at the lottery booth are clear alternatives 
because the EGM category refers to machines in hotels and clubs, in what outside 
Australia would be termed local casinos. At this level, machines and lotto tickets are 
clear alternatives: each is readily accessible and (given linking of machines5) each offers 
the possibility of a very substantial win.  
 
Tobacco and alcohol expenditure were also included as a means of capturing differences 
in the degree of permissive attitudes across states and time and are found to have 
interesting coefficient estimates. In terms of our preferred IV model, that on tobacco 
expenditure is found to be negative and that on alcohol expenditure is found to be 
positive. These findings are therefore inconclusive if we view them as proxies for 
permissive attitudes to the group of products known as ‘vices’, and are even more 
confusing if we consider the locations in which they are sold. Tobacco is sold in retail 
outlets that are also allowed to sell lotto tickets and alcohol is sold at venues that are not 
licensed to sell lotto tickets. In this perspective, the results are contradictory to a priori 
expectations. Australia has a strong antismoking lobby and the negative coefficient on 
the smoking variable might be picking up a cultural shift away from smoking in general. 
Expenditure shares on tobacco have been declining steadily throughout this time period 
across all states6.  
 
                                                 
5 Linking of machines within venues is permitted in Victoria, NSW, Queensland, Australian Capital 
Territory (ACT) and Northern Territory. Externally linked machines operate in NSW, Queensland and 
ACT. 
6 We have estimated the model excluding the expenditure variables (tobacco, alcohol and 
café/restaurant/hotel expenditure) and the results are remarkably robust. These results are available from 
the authors on request. We choose to report the results with their inclusion as they suggest interesting 
avenues for further research.  
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In terms of the wider leisure industry, we find a positive impact on expenditure in cafes, 
restaurants and hotels only in the case of the dummy variable specification. The state 
fixed effects vary across the specification but make most sense in the context of the IV 
model. Here we find significant effects for New South Wales and Victoria, the two 
states which are known to be the most liberal in terms of gambling legislation.  This 
suggests that the fixed effects, rather than the drinking and smoking variables, may be 
picking up the degree of permissiveness across states.  
 
As regards the business cycle (looking at the IV model) we find no significant effect on 
lotto sales from the rate of unemployment or from disposable income; but there is a 
positive and significant time trend. Whilst the existing literature talks of lottery fatigue 
and a tendency for sales to fall through time, one should remember that lotto here refers 
to the total turnover from all on-line games and over the period under examination 
significant changes in the lotto market have occurred such as the establishment of the 
two large multi-state lotto games. This may explain the positive time trend in lotto 
turnover. One way to disentangle these effects would be to introduce into the model 
dummy variables which switch to one when the each state joined the multi-state games. 
The problem with this approach is that, given the nature of a multi-state game, most of 
the dummy variables will switch to one at the same time. Moreover, the analysis above 
has already shown the potential misspecification that arises through the inclusion of this 
type of dummy variable. In this case it is not possible to replace the dummy variables 
with the respective turnover as turnover for lotto is the dependent variable in the model. 
We therefore have allowed all of these effects to be absorbed by a time trend.  
 
6. Conclusions 
 
The literature on the relationship between different forms of gambling has often focused 
on ‘substitution’ and ‘complementarity’ between products. Often, however, these terms 
are misapplied because, following standard usage in economics, they should be reserved 
for referring to the issue of whether cross-price elasticities are positive or negative, not 
to the quite separate question  of whether the introduction and spread of a new gambling 
medium cannibalises sales from existing media.     
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Here, we have focused on the latter question. Our case study has been of whether sales 
of lotto and lotto-style products in Australia were displaced by the introduction and 
growth of large casinos and   by the spread of casino-style machine gaming within 
neighbourhood hotels (pubs) and clubs. Opposite results were found in the two cases. 
The emergence of the thirteen (super-) casinos appeared to reinforce the lotto market 
whereas machines in the network of local gaming venues diverted money away from 
lotto. 
 
The results are of relevance to the policy debate in Great Britain where modern EGMs 
are to be permitted for the first time. Those forming the central product of a new 
‘regional’ (super-) casino will pose no threat to National Lottery sales, according to 
indications from Australia. If there is only one regional casino in the country, which 
there will be for the time being, it will, even more so than for the thirteen in Australia, 
be remote from most of the population and the destination only for infrequent visits. 
Expenditure there is unlikely to displace weekly or twice-weekly lottery play. It would 
seem more likely that it would divert expenditure away from alternative tourist 
destinations for day or weekend trips (although this hypothesis has not been tested in 
this paper). 
 
By contrast, Australian evidence suggests a potential for local casinos (of which there 
are now in Britain to be only eight new ‘large’ and eight new ‘small’) to divert 
significant sums from lotto and the causes it funds. An illustration of the possible size of 
impact may be obtained by extrapolating the regression results to suggest how much 
bigger lotto sales would be in the absence of EGMs in individual states. Consider, for 
example, South Australia, where EGMs in local venues were legalised in 1994. By 
2002, per capita turnover for these machines had reached AU$4,503 (player losses 
AU$523). Per capita lotto turnover was AU$181: with the displacement effect we have 
estimated, lotto sales would be predicted to have been AU$72 higher in the absence of 
EGM expenditure, i.e. the lotto market appeared to be 28.4% lower in 2002 than it 
would have been without the introduction of EGMs. To take another example, 
Tasmania permitted EGMs from 1996. Both lotto and gaming machines attract lower 
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per capita sales than in South Australia but our estimate of the proportionate drop in 
lotto sales from introducing machines in Tasmania is of a similar order of magnitude 
(20.0%). 
 
Local gaming venues in Australia, accessible and with 100-200 high prize machines, are 
just like those implied by the UK legislation authorising ‘large’ casinos.  The original 
proposals in the Gambling Bill placed no limit on the number of these ‘casinos in the 
community’. The severe restriction on their number by late variation of the terms of the 
new legislation represents a fortunate escape for the lottery and perhaps other gambling 
interests. But the process of reform may not yet have run its course. Our findings are 
relevant to an ongoing public debate.      
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Figure 1: Real per capita lotto turnover by state ($m), 1982/83 – 2001/02 
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Table 1: The Legalisation of Gaming Activities across Australian States. 
 
 Lotteries Lotto Instants Casinos Keno EGM’s 
New South Wales 
(NSW) 
1931 1979 1982 1995 Unknown 1956 
Victoria (VIC) 1957 1972 1981 1994 1988 1990 
Queensland 
(QLD) 
1921 1979 Unknown 1985 Unknown 1991 
South Australia 
(SA) 
1966 1973 Unknown 1985 Unknown 1994 
Western Australia 
(WA) 
Unknown Unknown Unknown 1985 Illegal Illegal 
Tasmania (TAS) Unknown Unknown Unknown 1973 Unknown 1996 
Australian Capital 
Territory (ACT) 
Unknown Unknown Unknown 1992 Unknown 1976 
Northern Territory 
(NT) 
1978 1978 1979 1997 Unknown 1990 
  
 
Sources: Victorian Casino and Gaming Authority, 1999 and Department of Treasury and Finance, 2001. 
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Table 2: EGM’s prices and taxes, 1997/98 
 
 
 
 
1997/98 NSW VIC QLD SA TAS ACT NT 
Turnover ($m) 30540 18098 4058 3292 207 1249 232 
Expenditure ($m) 2989 1711 601 395 24 127 20 
Tax ($m) 690 707 180 161 10 28 10 
Player return 90.2% 90.5% 85.2% 88.0% 88.4% 89.8% 91.4% 
Av tax rate 23% 41% 30% 41% 42% 22% 50% 
Price per dollar  10c 9c 15c 11c 11c 10c 9c 
 
 
Original Source: Australian Government (sub. D284, P.19) Reproduced from Productivity 
Commission (1999) “Australia’s Gambling Industries” Report No 10, AusInfo, Canberra. 
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Table 3: Modelling Displacement Effects for Lotto Turnover - 1982/83 to 2001/02. 
 
 
Model 1- Dummy Variables 
Estimation 
Model 2- Turnover Variables 
Estimation 
Model 3- Instrumental 
Variables Estimation  
Variable 
Co-
efficient 
Standard 
Error 
|t| 
statistic 
Co-
efficient 
Standard 
Error 
|t| 
statistic 
Co-
efficient 
Standard 
Error 
|t| 
statistic 
Lottery -7.689 (2.290) 3.36 -0.808 (0.317) 2.54 -0.368 (0.407) 0.91
Instants 3.575 (4.897) 0.73 -0.244 (0.147) 1.67 -0.117 (0.156) 0.75
Casino 0.828 (1.908) 0.43 0.000 (0.003) 0.10 0.017 (0.008) 2.02
Minor gaming 6.154 (1.570) 3.92 0.259 (0.080) 3.23 0.082 (0.101) 0.82
Keno -4.941 (1.972) 2.51 -0.182 (0.077) 2.37 -0.286 (0.087) 3.30
EGM's 0.626 (2.103) 0.30 -0.011 (0.003) 4.30 -0.016 (0.003) 4.87
Disposable income* -0.007 (0.003) 2.54 -0.005 (0.002) 2.18 -0.003 (0.003) 1.33
Tobacco expenditure* -0.118 (0.062) 1.89 -0.091 (0.062) 1.46 -0.161 (0.068) 2.38
Alcohol expenditure* 0.217 (0.052) 4.15 0.154 (0.044) 3.47 0.103 (0.049) 2.12
Cafe/restaurants/hotels expenditure* -0.039 (0.013) 3.02 -0.017 (0.012) 1.38 0.008 (0.016) 0.53
unemployment rate -0.035 (0.014) 2.43 -0.019 (0.013) 1.42 -0.012 (0.014) 0.84
NSW -9.253 (5.494) 1.68 3.175 (5.734) 0.55 17.542 (8.566) 2.05
VIC 13.978 (5.405) 2.59 13.763 (5.494) 2.51 27.991 (8.424) 3.32
QU -9.748 (4.604) 2.12 -7.846 (4.823) 1.63 1.801 (6.633) 0.27
SA -10.089 (4.496) 2.24 -8.125 (5.287) 1.54 10.590 (9.315) 1.14
WA -4.928 (4.793) 1.03 -1.087 (5.148) 0.21 9.450 (7.465) 1.27
TAS -4.075 (4.159) 0.98 -6.327 (4.836) 1.31 8.003 (7.312) 1.09
ACT -0.910 (9.669) 0.09 5.672 (8.716) 0.65 16.700 (11.131) 1.50
Time trend 1.131 (0.369) 3.06 1.668 (0.285) 5.86 1.741 (0.295) 5.90
Constant 75.224 (13.080) 5.75 54.703 (14.392) 3.8 30.594 (17.620) 1.74
R squared 0.984 0.760 0.788   
Adjusted R squared 0.986   0.728   0.760   
 
Note * indicates real per capita values. The omitted state is the Northern Territory 
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